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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Where a chattel not covered by the conditional sales contract is re-
possessed along with an automobile, the North Carolina court has found
liability.3 5 And, in South Carolina where the contract authorized the
taking of any property in the automobile the court held that that privilege
only applied to property not visible and found liability for property that
could have been seen.36
The principal case in denying liability in spite of the technical tres-
pass on plaintiff's premises is clearly in accord with the general rule.
However, if the same facts arose in North Carolina, the court would
probably grant at least nominal damages since a repossessing seller has
no right to enter the buyer's premises.3
7
JAMES R. TROTTER.
Constitutional Law-'"Separate but Equal" Test
in Graduate Education
In McKissick v. Carmichael1 the court decided that the separate law
school furnished Negroes by the State of North Carolina was not sub-
stantially equal, as required by the Fourteenth Amendment, to the law
school furnished white students at the University of North Carolina.
The University law school was ordered to admit qualified Negro appli-
cants. The decision followed by less than a year Sweatt v. Painter2 and
applied the principles first enunciated in that case to a situation ap-
proaching much nearer equality between the white and Negro schools.
The constitutions and statutes of the southern states require the
segregation of the white and colored races in the public educational
system.3 Educational segregation affording equal facilities has been
authorized by the federal courts as a proper exercise of state police
power since Plessy v. Ferguson4 in 1896, a case actually involving segre-
gation in interstate carriers. Segregation in public education was spe-
cifically held to be constitutional in the later case of Gong Lum v. Rice.5
While segregation per se does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment,
" Narron v. Chevrolet Co., 205 N. C. 307, 171 S. E. 93 (1933) (Personal be-
longings left in the glove compartment and on the back seat).
"o Sanders v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 180 S. C. 38, 185 S. E. 180
(1936).
"' Parrisv. Fischer & Co., 221 N. C. 110, 19 S. E. 2d 128 (1942).
187 F. 2d 949 (4th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 341 U. S. 951 (1951).
2339 U. S. 629 (1950).
"The children of the white race and the colored race shall be taught in sepa-
rate schools, but there shall be no discrimination in favor of, or to the prejudice
of, either race." N. C. Constitution, Art. IX, §2; N. C. GEN. STAT. §115-3 (1943).
For provisions in other states see MANGUM, THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE NEGRO, 79
et seq. (1940).
'163 U. S. 537 (1896).
275 U. S. 78 (1927). The state may impose segregation in private schools.
Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U. S. 45 (1908).
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the equal protection clause requires that the separate facilities furnished
must be equal. 6
For many years the federal courts ruled that this "separate but
equal" rule was satisfied by "substantial" equality.7 But with increasing
litigation in the field of segregation in education since the 1930's, the
federal courts have moved toward a stricter requirement of real equality
in fact. In Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada8 it was held that the
practice of sending Negro college students out of state for courses not
available within the state was a denial of equal protection: the required
equal facilities must be furnished within the state. Then, in Sipuel v.
Board of Regents9 it was emphasized that the right to equal facilities is
personal and present: the facilities must be furnished regardless of the
number of applicants and "as soon as for any other group." Johnson
v. Board of Trustees 0 held that provision for a white faculty to com-
mute to classes at a Negro college did not afford Negro students equal
protection. Further cases brought into question equality in the lower
public schools..'
In 1950, Sweatt v. Painter threw an entirely new light on the appli-
cation of the "separate but equal" rule in the field of higher education.
The filing of a suit to gain admission for Negroes to the University of
Texas law school had prompted Texas to establish, for the first time, a
Negro law school. The Supreme Court, in examining the physical
facilities of the two schools, found the Negro school unequal to the white
school. But more important, the Court compared the "intangible fac-
tors" of reputation of the faculty, experience of the administration,
position and influence of the alumni, standing in the community, and
traditions and prestige of the two schools. The Court stated that a
legal education '"cannot be effective in isolation from the individuals
and institutions with which the law interacts. The law school to which
'Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U. S. 78 (1927); McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S. F.
Ry., 235 U. S. 151 (1914) ; McMillan v. School District, 107 N. C. 609, 12 S. E.
330 (1890). See cases collected in Briggs v. Elliot, 98 F. Supp. 521, 531 (E. D.
S. C. 1951).
"For example in United States v. Buntin, 10 Fed. 730 (C. C., Ohio, 1882),
there was held to be no denial of equal protection to Negroes within a school dis-
trict though no Negro school was provided within the district and Negroes had
to go 5 miles to a school outside the district. In Cummings v. Board of Educa-
tion, 175 U. S. 528 (1899), discontinuance of a Negro high school in order to
maintain lower Negro schools was allowed "in the interest of the greater number
of colored children," though a white high school continued to be maintained. The
Court used the language that "Any interference on the part of the Federal author-
ity with the management of state schools cannot be justified except in the case
of a clear and unmistakable disregard of rights secured by the supreme law of
the land." Cummings v. Board of Education, 175 U. S. 528, 545 (1899).
'305 U. S. 337 (1938) ; Note, 17 N. C. L. REv. 280 (1939).
9332 U. S. 631 (1948).
" Johnson v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Kentucky, 83 F. Supp. 707 (E. D.
Ky. 1949).
'See p. 158, infra, on public schools.
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Texas is willing to admit petitioner excludes from its student body mem-
bers of the racial groups which number 85 per cent of the population
of the State and include most of the lawyers, witnesses, jurors, judges,
and other officials. . . With such a significant segment of society
excluded, we cannot conclude that the education offered petitioner is
substantially equal.'
12
Against this background the case of McKissick v. Carmichael's
arose to test the equality of the separate legal education given by the
State of North Carolina. The fact that the law school for Negroes was
not at the time of the suit a hastily set-up school, but one which had
been in operation for ten years with a student body of twenty-eight, a
faculty of seven, and an annual budget of $52,00014 differentiated the
case from Sweatt v. Painter.
The Court of Appeals found that the case "differed in circumstance
but not in principle" from Sweatt v. Painter. The court said there were
inequalities in those facilities capable of objective measurement-build-
ing,' 5 libraries, 16 the number of subjects offered, 17 activities such as
law review work,' 8 and the existence of a summer school at the white
law school. The size of classes at the Negro law school was found to
permit more personal instruction than at the white school but to be too
small for full discussion.19
Turning to a consideration of the intangible qualities of the two
schools, the court found that the faculty of the white law school was
superior in teaching experience, scholarly research, reputation, and in
work with legislative bodies. With fewer courses to teach, there was
" Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629, 634 (1950). In McLaurin v. Oklahoma
State Regents, 339 U. S. 637 (1950), decided at the same time as Sweatt v. Painter,
the Court held that the action of the University of Oklahoma in setting apart a
Negro graduate student, once admitted, in the classroom, dining hall, and library,
was a denial of equal protection. The Court will not allow embarrassing restric-
tions to be placed on the use of educational facilities after admission. The Negro
student must be free "to study, engage in discussion, to secure acceptance by his
fellow students on his own merits, and, in general, to learn his profession"' Does
this holding apply only to facilities immediately necessary for study, or to any
services furnished by the school? For example, see Time, Oct. 8, 1951, p. 85,
col. 1, and Oct. 22, 1951, p. 92, col. 3, on the problem of student admission to foot-
ball games.
13187 F. 2d 949 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U. S. 951 (1951), reversing 93 F.
Supp. 327 (M. D. N. C. 1950).4 73 SCHOOL AND SocETY 326 (1951).
"' The white law school building was described as "superior," and at the time
was in the process of enlargement. The Negro school was being moved to a
remodeled building described as "ample."
" The white law library had 64,000 volumes; the Negro law library bad
30,000.
x The white law school listed 40 courses; the Negro school, 27 courses.
18 The white law school has a law review which has been published since 1922
and a Chapter of the Order of the Coif; the Negro law school has neither.
1" Classes at the white school were as large as 80 to 100; those at the Negro
school were 8 or 9. Expert opinion gave the ideal number as 25 students.
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a greater opportunity for specialization. 20 The absence of white stu-
dents at the Negro school was said to deprive the Negro students of the
benefit of a full range of discussion and of an opportunity "to form ac-
quaintances with the persons who will later occupy positions of influence
in the profession." "It is a definite handicap to the colored student to
confine his association in the law school to people of his own class." 21
The court concluded that the circumstances at the Negro school of
greater personal attention and association with the race from which
future clients of the Negro students would come, which the District
Court had balanced in finding equality, "do not overcome the deficiencies
disclosed."
2 2
The grounds upon which the Sweatt and McKissick cases are 'de-
cided seem to lead to the conclusion that it is not possible for a state
to establish a separate law school for Negroes which will be found to
afford equal facilities. To attain equality in faculty reputation, adminis-
trative experience, alumni, and prestige of the school would appear to
be almost impossible for a recently established school (which most of
the separate graduate schools are) 23 Beyond these factors lies the re-
quirement of the opportunity to associate and exchange ideas with the
white segment of the population. In the Sweatt case the court stated
that with white students excluded legal education "cannot be effective"
and "we cannot conclude" [italics added] it to be equal. 24 By the use
of these phrases the court seems to be saying that segregation is per se
unconstitutional in legal education. 25
To what extent will other graduate schools be affected? By analogy,
the "intangible factors" of faculty reputation, administrative experience,
"0 "Most of the witnesses did not venture the opinion that the faculties were of
equal quality." "The University Law School, its faculty and its Law Review enjoy
a fine reputation in legal circles." McKissick v. Carmichael, 187 F. 2d 949, 951
(4th Cir. 1951). The District Court had found "ample testimony that the [Negro]
faculty is capable and . . .keeps pace with that at the [white] University." Epps
v. Carmichael, 93 F. Supp. 327, 330 (M.D. N. C. 1950). The District Court did
not discuss as such the reputation of the faculty nor the reputation of the school,
which the Sweatt case had listed as material factors.
"McKissick v. Carmichael, 187 F. 2d 949, 952 (4th Cir. 1951). The District
Court had recognized that 74% of the population of the state is white; but said
there was no evidence to show that any Negro lawyer ever represented a white
client, and that therefore advantages of contacts with members of their own race
would exceed any advantages of going to the white University. Neither decision
makes direct reference to the alumni of the two schools, another factor which the
Sweatt case held material.
-" McKissick v. Carmichael, 187 F. 2d 949, 953 (4th Cir. 1951).
-, For example, all five of the state-supported Negro law schools in the South
were established since 1939: Lincoln University, Missouri, 1939; North Carolina
College, ,1939; Texas State University, 1947; Southern University (Louisiana),
1947; and South Carolina State College, 1947. 73 ScHooL AND SocinTy, 326
(1951).
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629, 634 (1950).
22 See Roche, Education, Segregation, and the Supreme Court, 99 U. or PA.




and standing of the school would probably be held to be material. As a
practical matter, this would often determine the question. But would
association with white students necessarily be a factor in other graduate
education? In fields concerned with some degree of social work, such
as education, sociology, and possibly medicine, opportunity to associate
with the white population would probably be found to be a necessary
part of the education. In other fields more removed from the "human"
element, such as most scientific, engineering, and technical studies, there
would seem to be less basis for emphasizing this factor of association.
At any rate, the high cost of segregation itself26 and the uncertainty of
success in attempting to provide separate graduate schools for a small
number of students2 7 has brought about admission of Negroes into
graduate schools of white universites, where not otherwise provided,
in all but five southern states.28 While the new project of regional
"' For example, the average annual expenditure in 1949-1950 by the state for
each white student in the University of North Carolina Law School was $416; for
each Negro student in the North Carolina College school it was $1460. McKissick
v. Carmichael, 187 F. 2d 949, 953 (1951). In other Southern state-supported Negro
law schools, operational expenses in 1949-50 for each Negro student were: Lincoln
University (Mo.), $1,728; Texas State University, $2,390; Southern University
(La.), $1,990; and South Carolina State, $2,775. 73 SCHOOL AND SocIETY 326
(1951). From 1941 to 1943, Missouri spent $229 per student for 17,010 whites at
the University of Missouri and $697 per student for 1,228 Negroes at Lincoln
University. FRAzIER, THE NEGRO IN THE UNITED STATES 487 (1949).
2? Cases testing the equality of separate graduate education actually provided,
as distinguished from a failure to provide any facilities at all, have all found the
separate facilities unequal. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629 (1950); Missouri
ex rel Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337 (1938); McKissick v. Carmichael, 187
F. 2d 949 (4th Cir. 1951) ; Wilson v. Board of Supervisors of L. S. U., 92 F. Supp.
986 (E. D. La. 1950); Johnson v. Board of Trustees of U. of Ky., 83 F. Supp.
707 (E. D. Ky. 1949); McReady v. Byrd, 73 A. 2d 8 (Md. 1950); Pearson v.
Murray, 169 Md. 478, 182 Atl. 590 (1936).
28 For the school year 1950-51 the estimate is that 300 Negroes attended state-
supported Southern white colleges. Including private schools and summer sessions,
the figure comes to about 2,000. The Crisis, June, 1951, p. 400. Some of the
figures for individual schools are: University of Oklahoma, 60; University of
Kentucky, 85; University of Louisville, 20; University of Arkansas, 15; University
of Texas, 19; University of Missouri, 15; University of Delaware, 3; University
of West Virginia, 75; University of Virginia, 1; Louisiana State, 1; Union Theo-
logical Seminary, 22; and Berea College, 3. The Crisis, August, 1951, p. 458;
The Southern Patriot, Nov. 1950, p. 2. Baptist schools of theology, and Catholic
colleges in the South are now accepting Negroes. The New Leader, Sept. 3, 1951,
p. 2. On April 4, 1951, the Board of Trustees at the University of North Carolina
passed a resolution providing for the admission of Negroes into graduate schools
at the University when such schools are not otherwise provided in the state.
Raleigh News and Observer, April 5, 1951, p. 1, col. 6. As a result of this reso-
lution, there is at present one Negro attending the Medical School at the Univer-
sity, in addition to five in the Law School. On March 9, 1950, Kentucky repealed
segregation laws so far as they applied to institutions of higher education, both
graduate and undergraduate, private and public. Konnite, Extent and Character of
Segregation, 20 JOURNAL OF NEGRO EDUCATIoN 425 (1951). Among the five states
not admitting Negroes-Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, and South Caro-
lina-action is pending against the University of Georgia Law School, Southern
Patriot, Sept., 1951, p. 1. A Florida decision allowing admission of Negroes on a
temporary basis while other separate facilities are provided has been appealed to
the Supreme Court. State v. Board of Control, 47 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 1951) ; peti-
tion for cert. filed, 20 Law Week 3112 (1951).
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graduate schools in the South 29 points to an improvement in graduate
education, it does not seem to be a solution to the desire in the South
for segregation. The Gaines case requires that equal education be fur-
nished within the state. Consequently, a recent Maryland case30 holds
that the offer of graduate education at a regional school outside the
state does not meet the equal protection standard.
In undergraduate education, the intangible qualities of faculty, ad-
ministration, and school standing would probably be held material;
though perhaps there would be no definitely ascertainable need for
professional contacts. Nor, in most courses, would the opportunity to
exchange ideas with white students be so essential as in graduate fields
such as law. So far, undergraduate education has come in for little
litigation.3 1
Decisions determining the equality of segregated public lower schools
have so far not been based on "intangible factors."'3 2 Recent compari-
sons in high schools have been based on physical plant, location of the
school with regard to the students, transportation facilities, recreational
facilities, range of courses, teacher salaries, extracurricular activities,
and, in one case, the quality of instruction. 3 Comparisons in graded
"The regional plan was set forth in a compact by the governors of eight
Southern states with the purpose of providing regional graduate schools, with en-
rollment allowed students from any state in the compact. N. Y. Times, Feb. 8,
1948, p. 15, col. 1. The plan envisaged the use of four institutions for veterinary
medicine, seven for medicine, and six for dentistry. In 1949-50, education under
the plan was given 231 Negroes and 233 whites, and expenditures were $1,736,000.
Survey, Sept., 1949, p. 476. See Note, 1 VAND. L. Rav. 403 (1948) for the com-
pact of the Southern states and a discussion of its relationship to the equal pro-
tection clause.
"0 McReady v. Byrd, 73 A. 2d 8 (Md. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U. S. 827 (1950).
Maryland offered a nursing course at Meharry Medical College in Tennessee, under
the regional school project, at a cost, including traveling and living expenses,
equal to that in Maryland.
" A recent Deleware case which decided that the state Negro undergraduate
college was not the equal of the white university relied chiefly upon a comparison
of the physical plant, the range of courses available, and the faculty salary scales.
Mentioned but not emphasized were the quality of the two administrations and the
lack of distinctions and publications on the part of the Negro faculty. Parker v.
Univ. of Delaware, 75 A. 2d 230 (Del. Ch. 1950).
2 Briggs v. Elliot, 98 F. Supp. 529 (E. D. S. C. 1951), suggests the problem is
different at lower school levels for three reasons. First, there is no problem of
professional contacts. Second, at the graduate level, mature and less excitable
persons are being dealt with. Third, children are taken from parents by compul-
sion, and therefore more consideration must be given to the wishes of the parent.
3 Carter v. School Board of Arlington County, Va., 182 F. 2d 531 (4th Cir.
1950) (physical plant, range of courses, extracurricular activities) ; Brown v.
Ramsey, 185 F. 2d 225 (8th Cir. 1950) (teacher salaries, quality of instruction) ;
Corbin v. County School Board of Pulaski County, 177 F. 2d 924 (4th Cir. 1949)
(physical plant, location of school, transportation facilities, range of courses, extra
curricular activities) ; Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 98 F. Supp. 797
(D. Kan. 1951) (physical plant, location of school, range of courses); Blue v.
Durham Public School District, 95 F. Supp. 441 (M. D. N. C. 1951) (physical
plant, recreational facilities, extra curricular activities); State v. Board of Edu-
cation, 233 S. W. 2d 698 (Mo. 1950) (range of courses5.
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schools have been principally based on physical facilities34 and teacher
salaries and training.35
Some quarters have long contended that any segregation at all in
education is unconstitutional.3 6 Basically, this contention takes the form
that the authority supporting segregation in education is based on dicta
in Plessy v. Ferguson and should not be controlling; and that as
psychology shows harmful effects to result upon segregated children, any
segregation at all is discrimination. In Briggs v. Elliot,3 a case arising
from South Carolina, this issue was squarely raised. The majority of
the special three-judge federal court recognizes the statements on edu-
cation in Plessy v. Ferguson as dicta, but declares that "directly in point
and absolutely controlling upon us so long as it stands unreversed by
the Supreme Court is Gong Lure v. Rice [which] cannot be distin-
guished." 38  The court quotes from the Gong Lur decision :39 "The
question [of segregation] has been many times decided to be within the
constitutional power of the state legislature to settle. The decision is
within the discretion of the state in regulating its public schools, and
does not conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment." Final decision in
the Briggs case,4 0 plus future litigation, will disclose whether the Su-
preme Court is to maintain the "separate but equal" doctrine in the field
of education, abandon it completely, or continue to cut away at its sub-
stance by further limitations as in Sweatt v. Painter.
DIcIsoN McLEAN, JR.
Carr v. Coming, 182 F. 2d 14 (D. C. Cir. 1950) ; Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation of Topeka, 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. C. Kan. 1951); Freeman v. County School
Board, 82 F. Supp. 167 (E. D. Va. 1948).
" Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951);
Freeman v. County School Board, 82 F. Supp. 167 (E. D. Va. 1948).
" See anicus curiae brief for the Committee of Law Teachers against Segre-
gation in Legal Education, filed in Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629 (1950), re-
printed in 34 MINN. L. REv. 289 (1950) ; Waite, The Negro in the Supreme Court,
30 MiNN. L. REv. 219 (1946) ; Note, 56 YALE L. J. 1059 (1947). Plessy v. Fergu-
son itself contained a vigorous dissent by Justice Harlan on the grounds that the
purpose and intent of the Fourteenth Amendment was to invalidate segregation
laws and that classification by race was unreasonable. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U. S. 537, 552 (1896); Note, 49 COL. L. Rxv. 629 (1949). These views were
reiterated in a dissenting opinion in Briggs v. Elliot, 98 F. Supp. 529, 538 (E. D.
S. C. 1951) by Waring, J.
" 98 F. Supp. 529 (E. D. S. C. 1951).
"Briggs v. Elliot, 98 F. Supp. 529, 532 (E. D. S. C. 1951). "A decision which
the Supreme court has not seen fit to overrule and which it expressly refrained
from re-examining, although urged to do so in the very recent case of Sweatt
v. Painter, may not be disregarded." Boyer v. Garrett, 183 F. 2d 582 (4th Cir.
9 ong Lum v. Rice, 275 U. S. 78, 87 (1927).
The Supreme Court on appeal has ordered that the case be remanded to the
District Court for further action upon the progress report which had been required
of the school officials. The Court said it would like to have the "benefit of the
views of the District Court" on the report before making final decision. Raleigh
News and Observer, Jan. 29, 1952, p. 1, col. 4. Appeal has also been filed to test
the constitutionality of the Kansas educational segregation statute involved in
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951), 20
Law Week 3136 (1951).
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